states
9 have objected to the German Democratic Republic statement without making explicit reference to either of the aforementioned rationales. None of the objections was formulated in such a way as to preclude, in terms of Article 20(4)(b) of the Vienna Convention, the entry into force of the Convention between the German Democratic Republic and the objecting states.
II. The Implementation System of the Convention
In order to assess the scope of the German Democratic Republic statement, it is appiopiiate to outline briefly the Convention's structure and the Committee's implementation functions. 1"
The Convention is divided into three parts, in addition to a five-paragraph preamble. Part I (Articles 1-16) deals with the substantive provisions, including inter alia a comprehensive definition of torture, the provision of universal criminal jurisdiction over torturers, and the espousal of the extradition principle out purdre out dedere. Part II (Articles 17-24) covers the implementation provisions establishing the Committee -a supervisory body consisting of ten independent experts appointed by the Parties and acting in their individual capacity -and providing for its competences. Part TH (Articles 25-33) contains the usual final clauses concerning ratification, entry into force, amendments and the like; in particular, it includes the two aforementioned reservation clauses concerning the competence of the Committee and the judicial settlement of disputes.
Under Part II of the Convention, the Committee has been granted the authority to exercise four kinds of monitoring and implementing functions.
1 ' First of all, in accordance with Article 19, the Committee is to receive and consider periodical state reports -one every four years -concerning the internal measures that have been taken to implement the Convention. The Committee may make comments on individual reports and forward them to the states concerned, which in turn may reply. The Committee can include its comments and the states' counter-observations in its annual report to the General Assembly.
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Secondly, in accordance with Article 20, if the Committee receives reliable information about systematic torture practices within a State Party, it may institute confidential proceedings (if possible, in cooperation with the state under scrutiny) involving consultation, requests for information, inquiries and, with the agreement of the state concerned, a fact-finding mission to its territory. A brief account of these proceedings may be inserted in the annual report to the General Assembly. 
III. The Financial Provisions
Under Articles 17(7) and 18(5) of the Convention, the Parties are bound to pay directly for all meetings of the States Parties and for all the expenses of the Committee, and to reimburse the United Nations for the expenses incurred in providing (in accordance with Article 18(3)) the Committee with the necessary staff and facilities.
1Â
s to the apportionment of the contributions, the Parties decided at their first meeting after the entry into force of the Convention 14 that the annual expenses were to be shared among the Parties in proportion to the general contributions to the United Nations, provided that no state would have to pay more than 25% of the total budget Taking into account the well-known financial crisis of the United Nations, the Parties also decided that activities under the Convention, such as meetings of the Committee, would not take place until adequate funding was actually provided for by the Parties.!5 it should be noted prima facie that the concept itself of a global assessment of the annual expenses logically excludes any distinction implying the attribution of a given expense or contribution to a specific function of the Committee. 
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See id.; see also Burgers & Danelius, supra note 10, at 112-213. It should be noted that the expected amount of annual expenses for the coming years is not less than one million dollars.
IV. The Scope and Nature of the German Democratic Republic Statement
In practical terms, the quoted statement would appear to mean that the German Democratic Republic is willing to contribute only to the expenses incurred in connection with the Parties' meetings and with the Committee's functions under Article 19. The expenses related to any of the other aforementioned Committee's competences (such as, for example, fact-finding missions under Article 20) would thus have to be apportioned without taking into account the German Democratic Republic share. This would obviously imply that all of the other Parties to the Convention would have to pay an additional amount to replace the portion of contribution not paid by the German Democratic Republic. There is no doubt that this is the result that the German Democratic Republic eventually hopes to achieve by means of its statement. However, the legal effect and admissibility of the German Democratic Republic statement vary depending on whether it is considered a mere declaration of intention or a true reservation. In order to determine whether the German Democratic Republic statement is a mere declaration or a true reservation, both the objective element of the text of the statement and the subjective element of the German Democratic Republic's intention should be considered.
1^ A bonafide reading of the actual language used by the German Democratic Republic would lead one to conclude that the statement is indeed an attempt to unilaterally "modify the legal effect" of the financial provisions of the Convention and should thus be regarded as a true reservation in accordance with Article 2(1 )(d) of the Vienna Convention.
19 Moreover, both the wording of the statement and the attitude taken by the German Democratic Republic during discussions within various U.N. bodies^ seem to indicate that the German Democratic Republic considers its statement to be a specific condition on which its acceptance of the Convention is based, rather than just a way of recording an advance warning of a potential future claim.
However, the German Democratic Republic deliberately inserted an element of deliberate ambiguity in its statement 21 by labeling it a "declaration", probably because of the dubious admissibility of a reservation of that kind (as will be seen infra). As Professor Gaja remarks: "One of the difficulties in ascertaining the effects of interpretative or other statements is that there often is a deliberate ambiguity in the intention of the states that make them." Gaja, supra note 17, at 319 (emphasis added).
22
In the recent Belilos case the European Court of Human Rights recognized "la necessity de rechercher quelle etail rintention de l'auteur de la declaration" in order to determine whether a Swiss statement styled as an interpretative declaration was in law a reservation.
V. The Admissibility of the German Democratic Republic Statement
No question of admissibility can logically be raised if the-German Democratic Republic statement is deemed to be a mere declaration of intention. States can always express their policy views without affecting their or other states' rights and obligations, even though policy statements can sometimes produce legal effects, such as that of estoppel. If, on the contrary, the German Democratic Republic statement is regarded as a reservation, the issue of its admissibility ought to be taken into account. It should be considered, first, whether this kind of reservation is allowed by the Convention and, second, whether it is compatible with the Convention's object and purpose.
The first question is, in other words, whether the Convention implicitly prohibits reservations differing from those expressly authorized by Articles 28(1) and 30(2). Under Article 19(b) of the Vienna Convention a state may not formulate a reservation when a treaty "provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the reservation in question, may be made." it must be acknowledged that the Convention does not include a provision explicitly stating that only those two reservations which are specified are allowed.
23 Therefore, it could be argued that all kinds of reservations are allowed by the Convention in addition to those expressly mentioned (the only limitation being-that of the "compatibility rule" of Article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention). However, if all of the provisions of the Convention were subject to reservations, the insertion of the two mentioned reservation clauses would be of little use and would make little sense. 24 As an illustration, if states were free to make additional reservations, even the reporting system of Article 19 As to the Parties that have not objected or will not object to the German Democratic Republic reservation, after a certain period -not necessarily the twelve months of Article 20(5) of the Vienna Convention 53 -they should be deemed to have acquiesced in the German Democratic Republic's modification of the financial provisions of the Convention, in accordance with Article 21(2) of the Vienna Convention. In practical terms, the acquiescing Parties will have to pay an additional contribution deriving from the apportionment among themselves of the amount withheld by the German Democratic Republic.
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As to the Parties that did, or will, object to the German Democratic Republic reservation, such a rejection will certainly prevent their acquiescence and preclude them from having to pay any additional amounts besides their regular contributions. In fact, according to Article 21(3) of the Vienna Convention, the reserved financial provisions of the Convention "do not apply as between the [German Democratic Republic and the objecting] states to the extent of the reservation." This may only be taken to mean that no agreement has truly been reached between the German Democratic Republic and the objecting Parties on how to assess the contributions for some of the Committee's expenses. Accordingly, both the German Democratic Republic and the objecting states might legitimately decline to pay more than the amount they consented to, and no claims for payment could be reciprocally raised. In other words, the German Democratic Republic reservation would fully attain its financial goal, whereas the objecting states would merely avoid any direct detriment to their financial duties under the Convention. In practical terms, as previously mentioned, the deficit would have to be covered by the Parties that, not having formulated any objections, have acquiesced to such a budgetary rearrangement.
However, this does not seem to be the outcome pursued by the objecting states. It is not difficult to infer from the language of several objections that the objecting states have attempted not only to render the German Democratic Republic reservation unopposable to them, but also, because of its inadmissibility, to render it "without legal effect" 55 towards any other Party to the Convention. In other words, the objecting states appear to claim that "the assessment of the financial contributions of the States Parties ... must be drawn up in disregard of the declaration of the German Democratic Republic."
56 Such an intended effect of the objections would actually be equivalent to the withdrawal of the reservation by the German Democratic Republic. Yet unless the German Democratic Republic acquiesces to such a claim, it does not seem that this outcome could be based on the Vienna Convention rules on reservations.
There seems to be little evidence in practice to support the position that under either the Vienna Convention or general international law an inadmissible reservation is to be regarded as a nullity and that the provision subject to the reservation is to be wholly apSee Gaja, supra note 17, at 424, 330 ("under general international law, acquiescence to a reservation cannot be safely related to silence over a precisely defined period such as the one indicated in Article 20(5)").
5
It may be noted that if one is to regard the German Democratic Republic reservation as implicitly prohibited by the Convention, in order to overcome such a prohibition an agreement amending the Convention would be needed and mere silence would probably not be enough to deem the modification accepted by the non-objecting Parties. See Gaja, supra note 17, at 319-20.
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Objection by Norway, Trailis mullilalcraux, supra note 9, at 193. Objection by the Netherlands, id.
plied to the reserving state regardless of the other Parties' acquiescence.
5 ? On the contrary, it is generally held that the compatibility criterion is merely, as the International Court of Justice stated in its advisory opinion on the Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, "a rule of conduct which must guide every state in the appraisal which it must make, individually and from its own standpoint, of the admissibility of any reservation."58 .
It would appear, as a result, that as long as the non-objecting states actually accept to pay an additional amount to compensate for the German Democratic Republic's reduced contributions, the German Democratic Republic might be able to succeed in its attempt, regardless of the supposed inadmissibility of its reservation.
5 ' However, since acquiescence to this kind of reservation should not be presumed to have taken place until the German Democratic Republic actually begins to withhold its contributions, the silent Parties might still change their attitude and speak up. If this happens, that is if most of the other Parties refuse to pay in lieu of the German Democratic Republic, it is likely that the German Democratic Republic will be forced to reckon with its declaration, either by withdrawing it or facing a legally and politically uncomfortable dispute with the other Parties to the Convention.
Since, as a German Democratic Republic representative has declared before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, "torture [is] inconsistent with the concept of law and morality under socialism", 60 it seems rather odd that the German Democratic Republic would really place its financial needs before its legal and moral principles. Even though Article 18(5) of the Convention actually places a heavier than usual financial burden on States Parties, 61 and even though the practice of withholding contributions is certainly not unknown to international bodies or institutions, 62 it would be a bitter and frustrating disappointment if the effectiveness of a treaty protecting such a fundamental human right was hindered by financial problems.
5
The European Court of Human Rights recently held in the Belilos case that a Swiss reservation (formally styled as an interpretative declaration) was invalid because it did not satisfy all the requirements for reservations provided for in Article 64 of the European Human Rights Convention and applied the relevant part of the Convention as if Switzerland had never made its reservation. Ariel du 29 avril 1988, supra note 22, para. 60. As noted by Edwards, supra note 49, at 376-79, this appears to be the first instance in international practice of a judicial body holding a reservation to be invalid and wholly applying the provision subject to the reservation regardless of the other Parties' lack of objections. However, it should be taken into account that the Court did not consider the Swiss reservation as inadmissible in terms of Article 19 of the Vienna Convention but rather as not formulated in compliance with all requirements of Article 64 of the European Human Rights Convention. Furthermore, in light of the fact that the Court did not provide any explicit reasoning or explanation for its conclusion, it is questionable whether one should perceive this judgement as a turning point in the law governing treaty reservations. But see Edwards, supra note 49, who considers it a "landmark decision. 
